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Case No. 19,988 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant hereby petitions this Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah R. App. P. 35 for an Order granting a rehearing 
of this matter. The grounds for this Petition are as follows: 
1. It was error to deny appellant the right to present 
oral argument without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
2. This Court's decision and the decision below were based 
upon assumptions of fact not supported by the record and the 
Court apparently failed to consider and address certain key 
issues in the case. 
Counsel for appellant hereby certifies that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
A brief in support of this Petition is filed herewith. 
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DATED this /^^ day of August, 1986. / 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD CONCERNING THE DENIAL 
OF THE RIGHT TO ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Th Is i ' <\r iir i>.iin opinion in this case was filed July 
31, 1986, and copies mailed to the parties. 'ITn- parties had not 
been previously notified IIMI M R id I be^n submitted nor 
were they granted the right to oral argument. This was error for 
the reasons set forth below. 
The right to oral argument is an integral part of the 
constitutional right of appeal. See Moles v. Regents of the 
University of California, 32 Cal. 3d 867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 654 
P.2d 740 (1982); People v. Bricrham, 25 Cal. 3d 283, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100 (1979). Numerous studies have substan-
tiated the importance of oral argument in the appellate process. 
Several of the studies were summarized by the California Supreme 
Court as follows: 
Oral argument provides the only opportunity 
for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench. As a result, "it promotes understand-
ing in ways that cannot be matched by written 
communication.11 [Citation] For example, in 
complex cases, oral argument "provides a 
fluid and rapidly moving method of getting at, 
central issues." [Citation] In the words of 
one judge, "'mistakes, errors, fallacies and 
flaws elude us in spite of ourselves unless 
the case is pounded and hammered at the 
Bar.»" [Citation] 
No proof of the value of oral argument is 
more compelling, however, "than the fact that 
many judges find the opportunity for a 
personal exchange with counsel makes a 
difference in result." [Citation] This 
aspect of oral argument—the chance to make a 
difference in result—is extremely valuable 
to litigants. If oral argument is to be more 
than an empty ritual, it must provide the 
litigants with an opportunity to persuade 
those who will actually decide an appeal. 
Moles, supra, 654 P.2d at 743-44. 
In another recent study, two federal appellate court judges 
evaluated the effects of oral argument on their own decisions and 
stated as follows: 
2 
As case loads increase, oral argument 
becomes even more important to decision 
making. All too often, with the time pres-
sures that accompany heavy workloads, essen-
tial elements of a case are overlooked in a 
hurried reading and analysis of the briefs. 
In many cases, effective oral argument thus 
lessens the likelihood of an erroneous 
decision. 
Bright and Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial1, 70 A.B.A. 
J. 68, 69 (Sept. 1984). 
Rule 29(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure contains 
a presumption in favor of oral argument. Although the rule also 
provides that the Court may eliminate oral argument in some 
cases, fundamental fairness requires that the litigants be given 
notice that their case has been singled out as not meriting oral 
argument and the grounds therefor and be given an opportunity to 
present reasons why oral argument should be granted. Such a 
procedure is imposed by rule in the federal courts, Fed. R. App. 
P. 34(a), and should be imposed by judicial decision in the Utah 
state courts. 
Notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of 
allowance of oral argument is important for at least two reasons. 
The first reason relates to the decision making process used by 
the court. Appellant is informed that the initial decision to 
deny oral argument is made by the Supreme Court's central staff, 
which then prepares a per curiam opinion. Although the decision 
to deny oral argument and the per curiam opinion are subsequently 
reviewed by the Court, the size of the Court's caseload dictates 
that the review is largely perfunctory. The Court's review 
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process could be more meaningful, and would not be substantially 
more time consuming, if parties were given notice of and the 
grounds for the central staff's recommendation that oral argument 
be denied and an opportunity to present a short two or three page 
argument in response. 
A second reason for providing notice and an opportunity to 
be heard relates to the lack of an effective review of the 
decision to deny oral argument. Althoucjh the denial of oral 
argument may be discretionary, the Court has by rule imposed 
certain restrictions upon the exercise of that discretion. Rule 
29 provides that oral argument will be allowed unless the case 
fits into one of three categories specified by the rule. 
This Court has held with respect to other discretionary 
rulings by trial courts that detailed findings of fact are 
necessary to permit effective appellate review. E.g., Stoddard v. 
Stoddard, 642 P.2d 743, 744 (Utah 1982). The only review of this 
Court's decisions, except where a federal question exists, is 
through the rehearing process. A litigant cannot effectively seek 
a rehearing of a determination under Rule 29(a), however, because 
the Court does not state the basis for its decision, nor indeed 
even state that a Rule 29(a) decision has been made. Under these 
circumstances, the Court's discretion is in reality unbridled for 
there is no way for the litigants or the public to determine how 
or for what reasons that discretion was exercised. 
Appellant therefore respectfully asserts that it is entitled 
to notice informing appellant as to which Rule 29(a) category this 
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case has been placed under, and an opportunity to be heard 
concerning that decision. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON FACTUAL 
ASSUMPTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Court's opinion herein held that the lien of Wasatch 
Bank was inferior to that of Utah Farm Production Credit Asso-
ciation ("PCA") because the 16.72 acre parcel claimed by Wasatch 
Bank was not released from the underlying Real Estate Contract 
and a Warranty Deed recorded until after the Assignments to the 
PCA's predecessor had been recorded. Wasatch Bank respectfully 
asserts that that holding is flawed for at least three reasons. 
First, there was no record evidence to support the assumption 
that the 16.72 acre parcel was not released from the underlying 
real estate contract until 1979. This case was decided solely on 
the basis of documents appearing of record with the county 
recorder's office. The real estate contract referred to was not 
recorded, and there was no record evidence to even indicate that 
releases of lots were contemplated. As was established in 
Wasatch Bank's initial briefs in this matter, where there was no 
evidence to the contrary, the Court was required to presume that 
the 16.72 acres was conveyed on May 1, 1975, the date of the 
deed. Although the deed was not recorded for four years, it is 
improper to thereby assume that the deed was not delivered until 
1979. 
Second, this Court failed to specify what facts Wasatch Bank 
was deemed to have notice of by reason of the recorded documents. 
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The documents of record at the time Wasatch Bank acquired its 
trust deed on the 16.72 acres from Mr. and Mrs. Boley consisted 
of warranty deeds conveying the property to Boleys, the last of 
which was recorded in 1979, and certain assignments from Evergreen 
Turf and Tree Farms, Inc. ("Evergreen"), to Bank of American Fork, 
recorded in 1976, 1977, and 1978. There was nothing of record, 
however, vesting title to the property in Evergreen. The issue, 
therefore, was whether Wasatch Bank was required to investigate 
beyond the recorded documents to determine whether in fact 
Evergreen had any title which it could assign to Bank of American 
Fork. For reasons set forth in its initial briefs in this matter, 
Wasatch Bank asserted that it had no such duty. This Court failed 
to address and decide that issue. 
Third, this Court assumed that the assignments to Bank of 
American Fork included the 16.72 acre parcel. Although the legal 
descriptions on the assignments purported to include the 16.72 
acre parcel, the only evidence before the Court was that the 
16.72 acre parcel was no longer included within the property 
being purchased by Evergreen under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Evergreen could, of course, only assign that in which 
it had an interest. A review of the recorded documents would 
indicate, however, that Evergreen had no interest in the 16.72 
acres. Although the Warranty Deed to the 16.72 acres was recorded 
subsequent to the Assignments, if Evergreen did not have an 
interest in the 16.72 acres at the time the Assignments were 
executed, the Bank of American Fork did not acquire an interest 
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notwithstanding the fact that the Assignments were recorded prior 
to the documents upon which Wasatch Bank relies. 
Wasatch Bank respectfully asserts, therefore, that because 
the Court made factual assumptions which were not supported by the 
record and because Wasatch Bank had constructive notice only of 
the existence of a purported assignment from a corporation which 
had no record interest in the property, Wasatch Bank's interest 
was not subordinate to the liens appearing outside the chain of 
title. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Rehearing should be granted because Wasatch 
Bank was denied the right to oral argument without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and because this Court's decision was 
based upon factual assumptions not supported by the record and 
implicitly required that Wasatch Bank take constructive notice of 
documents not appearing in its chain of title. 
DATED this /^^ day of 
A 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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